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Abstract
In the growing trend of consumer-driven health insurance, more consumers than
ever have access to a high-deductible health plan paired with a health savings account,
where consumers can save pre-tax income for healthcare but also face higher out-ofpocket prices, in hopes that consumers will become smarter shoppers. The Health
Savings Plan is successful at lowering costs, but at the expense of consumers lowering
their adherence to healthcare, raising health risk. Even in a competitive market, HSP
plan designs require smart shoppers and more active healthcare self-management, but
without dealing with the informational imperfections that need to be overcome to
encourage this intelligent consumerism. In order for HSPs to succeed, they need to be
aligned with policy and innovations that mend these informational deficits, but even then,
policy makers need to be aware that HSPs do not tackle the main problem in the US
healthcare marketplace.
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I. Introduction
The United State healthcare market is in crisis, with costs growing year-over-year
and more consumers having to pay out-of-pocket, or worse, neglect care all together.
There have been a myriad of proposed actions to help ease these ailments, with one
particular idea gaining ground: the idea that increased consumerism will help the
insurance market by slowing down growing costs. In effect, it is an argument for the
decentralization of the insurance market, that by taking some of the power insurers have
in the form of subsidies for healthcare and giving it to consumers to choose what
healthcare goods and services they want to subsidize, that demand for unproductive
goods and services will fall as more conscious consumers will be more cognizant of the
marginal effect of each said good and service. Out of that idea, the Health Savings Plan
was created.
The Health Savings Plan (HSP) makes consumers face higher out-of-pocket
spending for healthcare good and services, but also gives them a savings account in the
form of a Health Savings Account (HSA) that employer contributions and pre-tax income
can be put into. In effect, that savings account, which can only be used for healthcare or
withdrawn for any good at the age of 65, becomes either an insurance against the higher
prices consumers face or a tool of retirement savings, allowing consumers to fund more
expensive healthcare goods while also becoming more aware of the true price of
1

healthcare. The results for HSPs are clear: while there is an initial substantial drop in
costs, those savings are not sustainable but do lead to less-substantial lowered costs in the
long-run. By creating incentives for consumers to be active economic agents in their
healthcare decision making process, the insurance plan can also curb over-utilization in
certain high-cost areas that supply-side healthcare plans could not. Moral hazard of overconsumption is also reduced as insured consumers, more aware of the costs of the service
and facing a higher copay, choose to consume less of it. That said, they are far from
perfect; various productive forms of preventative services, such as cancer screenings have
decreased, and significant drops in medical adherence also show a drop in active care of
ongoing ailments. Creating a situation where unhealthy people are forced to underconsume productive healthcare services is far from a societal improvement and long-term
costs might grow as even healthy people cut preventive care for short-term savings.
Due to the complex system of information in the healthcare market, advocating
for higher “consumerism” might not necessarily be a good thing even in a sufficiently
competitive marketplace. Results show consumers are not able to efficiently utilize
information on both their economic experience, such as marginal price structures, as well
as the payoff of healthcare decisions. Even if they could fully utilize it, the information
they receive might be incomplete, asymmetric, or too complex, creating an incentive or
decision that can lead to both a personal and societal sub-optimal return. Compounding
this is the stricter budget and higher prices at time-of-service inherent to the HSP plan
design, which can make services too expensive for those most at risk, and can lead to
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negative health outcomes as consumers lower quantity demanded for both low and high
return services alike.
Without properly addressing the information failings in a competitive insurance
market, and examining how some of those issues might be compounded by the HSP plan
design, insurers cannot hope to slow healthcare costs growth without creating a more
unhealthy populous, especially in a highly uncompetitive market. In this paper, the
information imperfections will be examined under the assumption of a competitive
insurance and medical provider markets in order to control for and focus on the
information problems in the marketplace and how they interact with the growing focus on
consumerism in healthcare. Then, that assumption will be relaxed to examine how
effective those information remedies might be in a marketplace as concentrated in the US
healthcare system. Under the assumption of a competitive marketplace, to ensure HSPs
work both insurers and policy makers must introduce a more robust information
infrastructure that facilitates consumerism, a system of incentives that encourages
socially optimal behavior in the marketplace, and other plan options that benefit lowincome higher risk consumers. When facing the reality of the US healthcare and
insurance marketplace, while these information remedies will help consumers and might
facilitate better functionality under a HSP, they do not tackle the root problem in the US
marketplace and cannot be expected to fix the overall existing problems.

3

II. HSP Adoption and Statistics
With the failure to control cost growth of supply-side plans such as the Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO) insurance model, which subsidizes price of the commodity
from in-network healthcare providers, insurers have tried a more demand-sided approach
in plan design with the high-deductible health plans (HDHP). HDHPs force consumers
to pay more out-of-pocket before they reach their deductible given some health budget,
thus encouraging “consumerism” by creating a situation where utility maximizing
consumers are more conscious shoppers over their demanded healthcare. In this regard,
consumerism is the act of making healthcare consumers more conscientious shoppers,
where instead of over-utilizing unproductive services due to the low cost offered by their
previous insurance, they will more thoughtfully weigh the marginal benefit of each
procedure and service against the marginal costs and their liquidity constraints. The hope
with these plans is that by introducing a higher copay and deductible, that moral hazard
will be reduced and over-consumption of low-return goods will be diminished. This idea
is not new or unique to HSPs, rather policymakers have tried to encourage this
consumerism through a variety of health insurance plans.
An earlier form of a HDHP, the Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) which
was created in 2001, created a fund that allowed employer contributions that could be
paid for healthcare only. HRAs did not allow consumers to contribute their income into
4

the fund and the account did not increase year-over-year, with any leftover money going
back to the employer. While the goal was to create a situation where, by giving an
account to the consumer, they would shop the marketplace to find the best value given
the cost of the unit of healthcare, the HRA creates a “use-it-or-lose-it” situation. Without
giving employees the option to invest their own funds, or save those funds in the longterm, a situation was created similar to a classic supply side plan, where there will be an
over-demand of units of healthcare as consumers. Both HRAs and classic supply-sided
plans create excess demand of healthcare goods and a moral hazard where the consumer
is incentivized to consume more than what is societally beneficial, driving up costs and
increasing inflation in the market. While both plans are still in effect today, it was
decided that a new system to encourage even more proactive shoppers was needed.
At its creation in 2003 with the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act, the HSA in its current form was created. The HSA allows for both
consumers and those offering insurance (usually employers) to contribute pre-taxable
income into the account and allowed contributions to be withdrawn at any time, tax free,
so long as the funds go to an approved healthcare good or service. The insurance
company will set up a HSA account with a bank, where the HSA funds can be invested
and earn tax-free interest for the consumer and revenue for the bank. Further, the fund
rolls over each year and can be used as a retirement fund; if funds are withdrawn before
the age of 65 for non-healthcare consumption, a 10% withdrawal penalty and taxes are
applied, but if the owner of the fund is 65 or over, the withdrawal is only subject to
income tax for non-healthcare consumption (United States Congress 2003). At
5

implementation, the HSA, combined with a high-deductible insurance plan to become a
High Savings Plan (HSP), had an annual deductible of $1,000 with a max out-of-pocket
of $5,000 for a single individual, much higher that existing plans, while also increasing
allowable employer contributions compared to the HRA. With the limits tied to inflation,
as well as other internal IRS calculations on markets, the max contribution for 2020,
including both employee and employer contributions, was set at $3,550 a year, with max
deductible and out-of-pocket maxes set at $1,400 and $6,900 respectively, all for singlecoverage (Miller 2019).
HDHPs, as a whole, were not popular at creation with either consumers or
companies providing insurance. Adoptions were initially non-existent, and only reached
4% employee adoption in 2006. Since then, HDHP adoption has dramatically increased,
with 29% of covered workers participating in some consumer-driven health plan (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2018). Employer offerings of HDHP is at an all-time high now as
well, with 29% of companies offering some sort of HDHP, representing 58% of covered
workers being able to invest in said plan (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018).
As HSP adoption has grown, more studies come forward each year to show that
the plan is successful in reducing costs in the short-term. In one case study, the state of
Indiana, concurrent with offering a PPO plan, allowed state employees to switch at any
point during a four-year period into one HSP with both relatively lower deductible and
state contributions or a second HSP with higher a deductible and contributions. Results
after the four-year period found, on average, that net spending per year on both medical
and prescription claims fell 38% for the group with the lower deductible and 72% for
6

employees with the higher deductible and contributions (Gusland 2010). While perhaps
not as drastic of findings, Kaiser found for 2018 medical claims data that annual average
premium for a single covered employee was $6,896 for all plans, $7,149 for PPO, and
$6,459 for an employee with a HDHP (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). HDHPs, and
HSPs in particular, have shown that companies, and the healthcare industry as a whole,
can curb costs by incentivizing health consumers to be more active in their decisionmaking process.
While results show that switching to a HDHP does lead to a good amount of
savings, the most drastic savings have not been continuous over time. Studies have also
shown that while HSPs do lead to lower spending compared to other health plans, their
drastic results are not sustainable. After switching entirely from a PPO at the beginning
of 2006 to a HSP, a large company found that the following year, spending on healthcare
had fallen by 25%. However, compared to PPO spending in the year prior to switch,
years after 2007 only averaged 4-8% lower healthcare spending in the HSP. In fact,
results found that the only services that stayed significantly lower for the entire time
period were laboratory (36% fall in initial year, settling between a 19-21% reduction) and
pharmacy spending (a 32% decrease in the initial year, then ranging between a 20-26%
reduction in the following years) (Roebuck 2013).
Premium costs of HSPs are much lower than that of HMOs and PPOs as well, but
since the popularity of HSPs has continued to grow, the premium costs are beginning to
catch up to other plan designs. From 2007 to 2018, annual HDHP family premiums grew
from $10,693 to 18,602, an increase of 74%, while non-HDHP have risen from $12,183
7

to $20,035, an increase of 64% (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). Non-HDHPs are still
more expensive, but as the HDHP and HSP offerings continue to grow, HDHP costs will
also continue to grow as less healthy individuals who were in richer plans transition to
these HDPs. Even though insurers might see cost-savings in the first year of HSP
adoption, those savings usually shrink by year two, and with current trends, HSP
premiums might not stay below those plans with richer coverage.
These health plans were created not only to cut cost growth however, but also
stop over-utilization of unnecessary healthcare goods and services to slow inflation,
without cutting utilization of productive healthcare services. Various reports have shown
that HSPs have succeeded in cutting certain types of utilization. Emergency room
utilization is always a potential cost-saving opportunity; many times, consumers will use
the emergency room when not medically necessary, not realizing the extreme expense for
these services for both themselves and the insurer. The same case study for Indiana
found that emergency room visits per 1,000 in 2009 fell from 308.1 to 210.4 for the
lower-cost sharing HSP and to 163.0 for the higher cost-sharing HSP. Similarly, they
found that physician office visits fell from 5,012 per 1,000 in the PPO to 3,612 and 2,701
for the lower cost-sharing and higher cost-sharing HSPs respectively (Gusland 2010).
This continues to be consistent across multiple studies; another case study shows that
outpatient visits dropped .48 per person, a fall of .12 per person in primary care visits,
and a fall of .36 per person in specialist visits (Fronstin 2016). Not only were policy
makers successful at cutting costs in healthcare spending, they were also successful in
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cutting healthcare over-utilization, but the results might not be as clear-cut as some HSP
proponents might hope.
Cutting healthcare cost and over-utilization, while keeping the populous
healthcare at the same level, is a clear efficiency improvement and may lead to a societal
gain where healthcare cost growth is slowed while consumers do not have to sacrifice
their health. However, HSPs might, given their current form, create the wrong type of
incentives that only lead to a short-term drop in healthcare costs. With a higher costshare and an account that builds year-over-year, consumers have a clear incentive to
utilize less healthcare units than under a supply-driven plan design. One of the problems
arise when these incentives are too strong and they actively create a situation where a
consumer might under-utilize goods where the net societal benefit is above the market
price. For instance, policy makers have found a statistically significant drop in cervical
cancer screenings in females 21 and older by 0.016 per person (Fronstin 2016). While
these lead to clear cost-savings in the short-run, should preventive screening and
prescription adherence rates fall, then serious medical conditions that might have been
more easily prevented can arise, leading to dramatically high-cost claims and a loss in
worker productivity. This can be a dangerous result, especially considering that now
both cancer and circulatory diseases are now the two most costly conditions driving
global healthcare cost growth (Mercer 2017).
Various studies also show that HSPs can lead significant drops in pharmaceutical
adherence as well, leading to under-utilization below societally beneficial levels. It has
been shown that, while not all costs stay dramatically low as they do after the first year of
9

implementation, that drug spending does stay significantly lower over time. That begs
the question, are consumers switching from more costly specialty drugs to generics that
can provide the same health benefits or are they simply not refilling their prescriptions
when necessary? Studying those with at least one chronic disease and in either a new
HSP or existing PPO over three years, researchers found that percentage of those staying
adherent to their medication in the HSP was significantly lower than those in a PPO; only
54% of those with elevated blood pressure stayed adherent in the HSP while 64% stayed
adherent in the PPO, and 68% in the HSP stayed adherent to their diabetes medication in
the HSP versus 73% in the PPO (Fronstein 2013). In a similar study, Fronstein (2016)
also finds that drug fill rates fall 0.757 per person. While less prescription fills in the
short-run might lead to some cost savings, in the long-run this can lead to dramatically
high cost claims that otherwise might have been easily prevented.
Clearly, results have been ambiguous for the Health Savings Plans and work is
already underway to make sure services stay affordable under this plan design.
Following a dramatic decrease of costs in year one, costs do settle to a cheaper, albeit not
as significant, level compared to other insurance designs. In this case at least, HSPs have
succeeded in lowering costs. The question becomes then, with preventive services
utilization, as well as medical and pharmaceutical adherence falling, are insurers creating
a situation where HSPs are only cutting costs as they induce consumers to not utilize
socially-optimal goods and services? If that is the case, will HSPs in the long-run lead to
higher costs as consumers do not receive treatment and their healthcare conditions
worsen, leading to high cost claims and loss in economic productivity? Insurers and
10

policy-makers need to examine why these costs and adherence levels fall below the norm
and why these consumers, even when facing a very high marginal benefit to a healthcare
service, choose to not utilize it. At least one part of this problem lies with information.
Information imperfections have long been a study in healthcare economics and by
examining how these imperfections and asymmetries relate specifically to the HSP
design, then insurers might be able to alleviate some of these issues and create a clear
welfare improvement.
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III. Information Imperfections in HSP Plan Design
3a. The Agents
When examining the information problems, it becomes important to lay out who
the agents are and why they are even in this market to begin with. One problem
hindering these plan designs from reaching a more optimal outcome are the multiple
types of agents involved in them, sometimes with clashing goals and various types of
information available to only them that help them achieve said goals. There is no reason
to assume the information held by each agent is either complete or symmetric.
Incomplete information is just that: an incomplete set of information will be used
efficiently in the decision-making process by a rational agent, but due to it being an
incomplete set the agent will incorrectly value the marginal benefit or cost from its true
value. This information failure can arise from information being too opaque or very high
search costs to retrieve it. Asymmetric information is an informational imperfection that
arises when at least one agent has private information that the others do not have. This
information allows the agent owning said information to receive some informational rent
on it, aka extra profits at the expense of the other agents. This paper will focus on three
different types of agents with diverging goals and how their privately-maximizing actions
might lead to a welfare loss in the presence of Health Savings Plan and an incomplete
market for healthcare information.
12

The first type of agent is the patient and consumer of healthcare. This agent will
want to maximize their utility based on the marginal preference of healthcare goods and
some price-normalized non-healthcare goods. As a perfect micro-economic consumer,
their consumption will be based on their marginal rate of substitution for healthcare and
non-healthcare goods and their liquidity constraints, i.e. their HSA money plus some
initial endowment of wealth. Further, following Grossman’s (1999) human capital model
for health, consumers will be consumers and producers of their own health, but health
will also be both a commodity and investment. As time spent sick is not only a disutility,
but also takes away time that could be used to earn a wage, consumers will “invest” in
their health by consuming health services and using time to partake in healthy activities.
In that way, consumers will produce healthy actions as an investment to receive an
increased number of healthy days, but will also will consume these healthy days to earn
either more wages or increasing their free time, increasing their utility. The two most
important pieces of asymmetric information these agents will hold is the current level of
their health and their unobservable behavior in regard to these healthy actions.
The second type of agent is the provider of the healthcare goods and services, or
any doctor, nurse, or technician that provides some healthcare service. As in the standard
economic model, a provider of any goods or services will try to maximize revenues and
minimize costs in order to receive the highest level of profits possible. The model,
however, becomes infinitely more complicated when examining the human aspect of the
provider. Surely, not all providers care only for profits and at least some take joy in their
work and helping others or adhere strongly to the Hippocratic Oath. Then, there must be
13

some account for marginal return on “honesty” or altruism, where instead of providing a
procedure to the consumer that would maximize profitability, the provider gets some
return from providing a potentially less-profitable service that would maximize return for
the consumer despite the opportunity cost of not being able to bill them higher. Various
studies of microeconomic games show in reality that altruism is exceedingly high, with
agents showing a high preference for not only altruism, but also a high preference for
punishing those that do not follow the “rules” of altruism, even if that punishment comes
at a cost to them (Gintis 2003). In effect, each provider has a marginal preference for
helping consumers, which will be especially strong if they believe they will see the
consumer on multiple occasions, and will suggest a service that aligns with their profithonesty preferences. The asymmetric information the provider holds is the productivity
of a healthcare good or service and their heterogeneous preference for “honesty”. The
provider will also share some asymmetric information with the insurer, the marginal
profitability of a healthcare good or service.
The third type of agent in this situation is the insurer. Their job is to create a
contract for a health plan that will meet, at minimum, the consumer’s reservation utility
to accept the contract, while also maximizing their profits. Their contract must also
satisfy the condition that providing protection to the consumer at least to the consumer’s
reservation utility (the minimum amount of return the consumer expects from the
insurance plan before investing) and create a sufficient risk pool of consumers so that
costs stay at a reasonable level. They must also create a contract that creates a payment
schedule for providers, historically in the form of a fee-for-service schedule that pays out
14

a provider after a service is performed. For simplification purposes in this paper, it will
be assumed that insurers can act as their own policy makers so long as the problem does
not require any legal fixings or government intervention; for example, should an
incentive payment or change in the existing HSP structure be needed, they can take it so
long as it meets the minimum level of legal requirements and improves upon their
maximization problem. Likewise, although most consumers’ employers act as an
insurance intermediary, setting up a plan that will meet their own budgetary needs and
offering it to its employees, it will be assumed that consumers receive their HSP directly
from insurers.

3b. Moral Hazard
3bi. Behavioral Hazard
By giving the consumer a higher deductible, but also an account to be spent on
only healthcare, the HSP plan design can be seen as an attempt to decentralize the
healthcare industry. Instead of insurers making a wide variety of decisions on which
producers and products should be subsidized, and by how much, they can offer less
subsidies and let consumers shop for themselves. This is in effect a very neoclassical
argument; the market price will provide private and societally optimal welfare and any
distortion from the market price, whether warranted or not, will lead to sub-optimal
results. Although very few would argue the demand for insurance protection against
uncertainty is a bad or irrational thought, there has been numerous arguments against the
15

supply-side method of subsidizing healthcare with broad discounts and subsidies, leading
to moral hazard on the part of consumers.
Moral hazard in the insurance industry has been described as the phenomenon
where “widespread medical insurance increases the demand for medical care” (Arrow
1963). The problem arises as consumers view the insurance similar to a subsidy on the
price of a healthcare good or service. According to neoclassical theory, the market price
internalizes both the private and societal benefit so long as the market is perfectly
competitive and any subsidy that puts the price below the market price will, according to
that school of economic thought, remove this equality and will cause the private return at
that price above the societal return. Hence, the incentive of moral hazard occurs, causing
excess demand for healthcare by consumers, the excess spending causing price inflation
in the marketplace, and a loss for insurers.
One of the main arguments for coinsurance is to reduce this moral hazard. Under
full insurance, consumers would have a very low marginal cost on healthcare
consumption, to the point where a consumer can utilize unnecessary goods and services
and drive up marketplace costs. By introducing some cost-sharing to the consumer, there
is less incentive to over-consume as marginal costs increase and come closer to unity
with the market’s marginal cost. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, one of the
most ambitious socio-economic research projects of all time, found about -0.2 price
elasticity of demand for healthcare demanded based on a change in out-of-pocket costs
(Aron-Dine 2013). While the change is relatively price inelastic, the RAND experiment
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rejects any idea that cost-sharing and medical utilization were completely unrelated, thus
some overconsumption due to moral hazard could be reduced by increasing coinsurance.
In this regard, HSPs are at least slightly successful in reducing moral hazard. By
introducing a higher deductible and prices at the time of service, these plans are able to
bring the private costs of healthcare closer to the societal cost of healthcare than supplysided plans such as PPOs. While the most striking utilization decreases for most services
diminishes as time goes on, most services stay at slightly lower quantities demanded than
other plan designs, while some see drastically diminished quantities demanded year-overyear. However these results, and using the RAND price elasticity of demand on these
results, can be problematic for at least two reasons. The first is that this price elasticity of
demand is a linear function juxtaposed on a non-linear cost structure (covered more in a
later section). The second is that reducing quantity demanded is a net welfare loss if it
encourages consumers to utilize less than socially optimal of a healthcare good.
Results have unfortunately shown that when consumers switch to a HSP they not
only lower utilization of less-productive services, that they will also lower utilization in
productive services such as medical adherence to pharmaceuticals. Consistent with the
RAND study’s results, when faced with higher out-of-pocket cost sharing consumers
lower medical utilization. One explanation in the theory framework that might explain
this is that consumers are unaware of the strong positive return as they lack the proper
information on how to value healthcare goods and services, and given the imperfect
information, categorically undervalue these returns. Studies show a strong positive
correlation between “certainty” and medical adherence; when a consumer has the proper
17

information on their health state and has the best up-to-date information on how to treat
it, they are much more likely to remain medically adherent (Frain 2009).
Given the growing number and accessibility of medical transparency tools, it
might be hard to understand why consumers continue to undervalue these goods and
services. Some have argued that even with this new information technology that certain
information regarding the present and future returns are hard to understand, or even
notice, at best and might undervalue future expected risk. Suppose a producer informs a
consumer that they have some sort of disease and gives them best practices to treat it.
The consumer though might be unaware of how comorbidity affects their disease, not
keep up to date with changes in technology that affect best practices, might not use all the
information networks at their disposal, etc. Worse yet, given this surplus of information,
consumers must use all of it to create some optimal valuing of their future and discount
future returns against today’s costs. Then it might not only be that consumer’s lack
perfect information on their health status, but they also are not able to properly value and
process it.
Substantial work has been done to try explain why consumers might not be
“perfectly rational” insofar as utilizing all information and work continues as behavioral
economics grows as a field. DellaVigna, one such researcher, shows evidence for a
“limited attention” model, where the value of an item (inclusive of price) to a consumer is
a function of both a visible component and an opaque component. The consumer will set
a preferential marginal value based upon all of the visible, easy to understand information
as well as some amount of the opaque, harder to understand, information. Should they
18

fully understand the more opaque information they will fully utilize said information in
their valuation process. Much more likely though, is that they will either have not fully
understood said information or received an incomplete form of it, leading them to
incorrectly value at least some return on the good or service (DellaVigna 2009).
Baicker (2012) expands DellaVigna’s inattention model to capture what she calls
“behavioral hazard” in healthcare, the phenomenon of people underutilizing productive,
high value healthcare goods and services. This behavioral hazard happens for two
reasons: the severity of certain symptoms versus others, as well as biases and false beliefs
due to faulty information on the benefit of a service. If a sick agent faces multiple
symptoms of varying degrees of pain, the rational agent will get treatment for all those
symptoms so long as the marginal benefit of treatment is greater than or equal to the
marginal cost. However, the “inattentive agent” will put a higher weight on painful
symptoms, while discounting or even ignoring less painful symptoms, then get treatment
so long as the benefit of getting treatment on these subjectively rated symptoms is greater
than the cost. The behavioral hazard is then measured in the difference between the true
marginal benefit of the procedure against the perceived marginal benefit.
One striking example of this behavioral hazard is medicine for those with high
blood sugar and diabetes. High blood sugar can be fairly asymptomatic on its own,
causing irritability or headaches, but paired with diabetes can have drastic results, such as
amputation, heart disease, and stroke. From an economic perspective, this can also lead
to a higher disease burden with increasing insurance premiums as well as years lost in
productive life. Given the potential outcomes, adherence to medicine to control high
19

blood sugar is shockingly low. One study finds that, when prescribed a glucose-lowering
prescription, only 39.4% remained adherent to the drug after 24 months and a striking
4.0% never even filled their initial prescription (Garcia-Perez 2013). Given that this
inadherence can lead to death, it is unrealistic to say that the consumer is simply
indifferent to the worst-case scenarios versus the cost of adherence, but much more likely
that it is some combination of the consumer not fully understanding the marginal benefit
and their liquidity constraints.
Put into Baicker’s model, the effect that a high out-of-pocket cost that is inherent
in a high-deductible health plan can lead to very negative outcomes. Consumers should
be at least somewhat aware of the return on medical adherence given their provider’s
suggestion and the information networks available to them, but due to this lack of
certainty and knowledge on opaque information, consumers can drastically undervalue
services and severely shorten their productive years. Worse yet, given the RAND’s outof-pocket price elasticity of demand findings paired with higher deductibles, insurers
might be creating a situation where consumers reduce non-productive and productive
utilization uniformly. Studying the RAND experiment results, Lohr (1986) found that
when comparing those in a free insurance plan to those in a plan with high cost-sharing
that, when given the choice of a medically-considered highly effective service for an
acute condition, 28.4% of free plan holders compared to 19% of cost-sharing enrollees
sought care, while 25% of free plan holders sought care that was deemed medically
ineffective and 18.6% of those in cost-share plans used the same medically ineffective
service. Interestingly enough, when separating low and high income individuals, both
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groups had similar outcomes where low and highly effective care was reduced, and the
only service utilization not significantly reduced by cost sharing was highly-effective
medical care for chronic conditions (Lohr 1986).
While the moral hazard of overconsumption might be slightly reduced, the gains
from that can be lost to the long-run costs and loss of productive workforce due to
behavioral hazard leading to negative health outcomes. Given the vast amount of
information needed in order to accurately value the marginal benefit of some medical
service, consumers will most likely undervalue to marginal benefit while simultaneously
facing a higher marginal cost. In effect, insurers and policy makers might have reduced
the overconsumption of non-productive services, but they have inversed the problem,
creating a situation where a consumer is more likely to under-consume healthcare that
they need.

3bii. – Provider Moral Hazard
Providers hold more information and training, which will allow them to hold
private information on service productivity and profitability. This gives the profitmaximizing provider the incentive to suggest the most profitable services to them, not
necessarily the most productive for the consumers. This sets up a principle-agent
problem with the consumers and providers. Suppose there is a completely uninformed
consumer and only two medical services that the provider can offer: service A which is
less productive but offers a higher profit, and service B, which would return less profit
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for the provider but a better outcome to the consumer. The provider will then chose
whatever service is a higher return for them, based on their marginal preference for
“honesty” and profit and the consumer can only either accept or reject the service, based
on their expected marginal benefit. Should the producer’s preference for honesty and
altruism sufficiently outweigh their preference for pure profit, then they will offer service
B. However, there is the chance of a dishonest healthcare professional, leading to an
offering of service A. Should service A be accepted by the consumer, who is unaware to
the profit schedule for each service, the marginal productivity of each service, or being
completely unaware of alternative services (service B), then they could receive long-term
costs as the consumer develops an illness that was preventable with the proper
consumption of healthcare.
It has been assumed that all agents in this situation are rational in that they will
maximize their utility based on their preferences and all relevant information that they
hold. However, when second-order rationality is assumed, the case of “honesty” in the
healthcare profession can lead to further problems. Second-order rationality is the case
where an agent knows they are rational and maximize their utility based on preferences
and available choices, but they also know other agents are rational and will maximize
their utility. Then, an agent must not only consider their best choice, but also the choice
they expect the other agent to play.
When second order rationality is assumed, consumers of healthcare will choose a
provider and be offered service A or B by said provider. The consumer, again, can only
accept the provider’s suggestion or deny it, since due to the asymmetric information on
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service productivity, the consumer will most likely be unaware of the non-offered
service. The consumer will know in this case that the provider is rational and suggesting
services that will maximize their utility based on their marginal preferences for profit and
honesty. The problem arises from the fact that the consumer knows that the provider
offers services based on their preference for profit and honesty, but does not know how
strong either preference is. In other words, the consumer does not whether or not the
provider has sufficient incentives to be honest and suggest the best service available to
the consumer. A distrust then forms in the consumer, drastically effecting their choice to
either accept or reject the service.
Surveying shows that distrust in healthcare providers is significant and can range
drastically based on demographics. In one survey showing racial disparities in healthcare
trust, 51.4% of black consumers believed they had been deceived in the past by a
healthcare provider, while 42.4% of white consumers believed the same (LaVeist 2000).
Should this distrust exist in the consumer, they will be more likely to reject the provider’s
service offering, even if the provider is offering the most productive service. This
distrust can be made all the worse due to the fact that HSPs can incentivize a consumer to
not utilize productive services in order to save their seed money. If a consumer is already
distrustful that the provider does not have their best intentions at heart, and now must also
face a higher out-of-pocket cost, they are much more likely to reject services that could
improve their long-term health.
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3biii. Consumer Moral Hazard
Insurers also face the problem of moral hazard from the consumer potentially
driving up costs. Insurers, when creating a contract, should create a risk factor for the
pool of consumers based on the consumers’ average health, then create a cost sharing
structure based on some amenable cost that is equal to or below what the consumer is
willing to pay. The problem then becomes that the insurer does not have available
information on the consumer’s action after they have accepted the contract and before the
contract expires. For instance, after accepting the insurance contract, a consumer might
take up is smoking. While the “smoking high” might bring net utility to the consumer, it
will raise the costs of the risk pool and insurers do not have a method or system of
surveillance to make sure the consumer to receive information if a consumer takes up
smoking. It also raises the risk that the consumer will need to, due to their unhealthy
lifestyle, consume more medical services in the long-run; moral hazard again leads to
increased demand in the healthcare marketplace. As consumers consume more due to
their unhealthy lifestyle and hit their deductible sooner, the insurer must pay a higher
percentage of healthcare costs in the current contract period, as cost sharing rates are
usually set at a fixed rate over a contract’s life time.
This moral hazard is not unique to the HSP plan structure and is a very common
incentive compatibility problem present in most contracts. Take the classic principleagent contract problem. In the case of the insurance market, the insurer must make an
insurance plan that maximizes their expected revenue, which is the summation of all
payments received to them less the probability of having to pay out to consumers based
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on the riskiness of each pool of consumers (Macho-Stadler 2001). In order to get the
consumer to accept the insurance plan they are offering, then the coverage offered (utility
to the consumer) less the copay the consumer must pay (a disutility) must be greater than
or equal to the consumer’s reservation utility, which is the minimum net utility of
coverage the consumer must receive in order to even consider taking the insurance plan
(Macho-Stadler 2001).
Suppose the consumer has two mutually exclusive options in a time period after
agreeing to the insurer’s contract, an unhealthy option and a healthy option. The
unhealthy option, such as going out drinking with friends, provides net utility to the
consumer, while the healthy option, such as going on a run then eating a healthy meal,
provides disutility. Further, these two options are linked to an unhealthy outcome and a
healthy outcome at the end of said time period, where the probability of their health
deteriorating increases with the unhealthy option, while they are more likely to stay
healthy with the healthy option. There is now diverging incentives between the insurer
and consumer; the insurer would like the consumer to take the healthy option, lowering
the probability the consumer will become sick and raise insurer’s cost, but that action
would bring disutility to the consumer.
The information problem becomes that the insurer does not have the necessary
information to know what action the consumer has taken. The consumer is more likely to
have a healthy outcome when they take a healthy action, but the probability still exists
that the consumer will take every healthy action and still receive an unhealthy outcome.
Due to this probability, the insurer cannot simply penalize the consumer with higher cost
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sharing when they see an unhealthy result. One example of this is smoking; companies
are beginning to charge consumers a higher cost share if they identify as a smoker
(Wechsler 2011). However, this is ineffective in that it requires the consumer to be
truthful and an insurer cannot charge the higher cost share to a consumer if they develop
a smoking-like illness, as they cannot be sure if the consumer ever actually smoked. The
fact that, when given the option of multiple plan designs, consumers that choose HSPs
will be on average healthier, might mean that some of these consumers might receive less
disutility, or even net utility, from taking a healthy action leading to a better result than
previous plan structures, but without explicitly tackling the diverging incentives problem
in the healthcare design, HSPs might lead to a net improvement but will still not
completely eliminate the welfare loss in profitability to insurers by the consumer’s
actions.

3.c. – Adverse Selection
The private information that the consumer holds with regards to their current
healthcare status can lead to adverse selection in plan adoption choices. Adverse
selection occurs in the insurance market when one agent, given the options between
multiple insurance plans, has relevant knowledge that the insurers either do not share or
cannot directly observe. Some agents can then extract informational rents by choosing an
insurance plan that is not designed for them. One important example of this
informational rent is that a consumer is more likely to know of their healthcare status
than any insurer is to know the risk of insuring the consumer. This creates a situation
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where the consumer of insurance plans is more likely to put a higher weight of
importance on cost-sharing over benefits offered if they are healthy, and vice versa if
they are in particularly poor health, should the insurer offer the option between two or
more plans.
The effects of adverse selection can be drastic, potentially leading to a complete
collapse of a market. This is formalized by Akerlof’s (1970) famous paradox of the
market for used cars in which the entire market collapses, despite that both buyers and
sellers are willing to participate in the sale. In the case of insurance, Akerlof expanded
this to the healthcare insurance market for senior citizens. The insurer, who knows the
average health of a senior consumer, but does not know each individual consumer’s
health, will offer a plan to all senior consumers with prices based off the average health
of those they believe will accept the price. The very healthy senior consumers, who do
not want to pay the high price, will leave the market for insurance, leaving only the
medium and very unhealthy consumers. This will drive up claims cost and then
insurance cost, forcing the medium health consumers to leave, leaving only unhealthy
consumers, and causes a negative feedback loop that leaves consumers and insurers
wanting to engage in the insurance market, but at a price where no insurance is bought
and the market collapses.
It is beneficial to look at what would the optimal solution be, so that policy
makers can examine where the failure happens and find a next best solution. Insurers
might first look at providing only one plan and pooling all their risk together. The
problem the same as Akerlof’s (1970) where if all consumers are pooled together, then
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the least costly consumers will simply leave the plan. For that reason, in a sufficiently
competitive insurance market, then the equilibrium will only exist in a set of contracts
that offers the correct incentives for consumers of different health level to join the
insurance plan that would suit their needs best (Rothschild 1976).
In a situation where pooling is not available, an insurer would offer two plans
both with the same coverage, an unhealthy plan and a healthy plan (Macho-Stadler 2001).
While both plans offer the same benefits and level of protection, the unhealthy plan
would have higher cost sharing due to a higher risk pool. This would lead to a profitmaximizing solution for the insurer as unhealthy consumers must pay more to cover their
own costs. The problem then becomes, given the option to freely switch between the two
insurance plans at the beginning of the year and the fact that screening each consumers’
health is improbable, both consumers will elect the cheaper plan due to the lower costsharing. This will eventually lead to the collapse of the risk pool; as claims cost rise year
over year, while insurers pay a greater portion of the cost due to all consumers entering
the low cost share plan, insurers will have no choice but to raise cost sharing. This will
continue until healthy consumers leave the plan to find a cheaper plan on the
marketplace, causing a negative feedback loop where costs continuously rise and healthy
consumers leave the plan, until the insurance plan collapses.
This adverse selection argument is one of the main argument for varying types of
deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums in different insurance plans. The optimal, and
only, solution then is to change the plan structures that leads the consumer to reveal the
asymmetric information they hold on their health by choosing the plan that will best suit
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their healthcare needs. In this case, the only equilibrium solution will be offering a more
fully insured plan with a higher cost-share and lower deductible that incentivizes
sufficiently unhealthy consumers to choose it while also offering a plan that has a high
deductible, but has a low enough cost-share that healthy consumers who do not expect to
consume much healthcare will choose it. It is then the insurers’ job to find an optimal
level of cost sharing and deductibles that will incentivize the consumer to enter the plan
that will best suit their needs without leading to collapse of the insurance market. If the
insurer is successful at creating these plans, the asymmetric information on the
consumer’s health will be revealed when they chose a plan; by creating strong enough
incentives for consumers to only chose the plan that best fits their health status, then the
private information on consumer health will be signaled to the insurer at the time the plan
is chosen (Macho-Stadler 2001).
What insurers must realize is that these HSPs are synonymous with lower costshare, high deductible plans from this classic insurance problem and are made to most
benefit healthy consumers, and that part of the reason they have been so successful at
saving costs is that the plan design causes healthier consumers to join (Fronstin 2016).
As their popularity has grown and rumors of cost-savings have grown, less healthy
consumers have been pushed into them, so that the cost differences between HDHPS and
other plans are shrinking (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). Not only that, but now 39%
of employers have removed their offerings of other plan types and only offer HDHPs
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). Insurers and consumers need to realize that not all
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plan designs are created for each type of consumer, and by encouraging consumers to
join a plan that might not be best for their health needs, costs will continue to rise.
Further, beyond these plans attracting healthier consumers, they also draw in
high-income consumers who are able to use their HSA as a tax shelter. Fronstin (2016),
in his case study for PPO vs HSP enrollees found that on average, not only were HSP
enrollees healthier, but they also had a 13.8% higher income than the average PPO
enrollee. This also caused a statistically significant difference in healthcare utilization,
where only 28% of those with an income under $50,000 and a HSP received a physical
exam from the doctor while 44% of those making over $125,000 received an exam and
emergency room visits even increased for the lowest income level (Fronstin 2016).
Insurers must realize that HSPs, given their higher deductibles, low cost-shares, and
incentives to save, are most beneficial to those consumers that are either high-income or
healthy and must make sure there is some type of insurance plan available that protects
their most vulnerable consumers.

3d. Spot prices and Non-continuous costs
Given the consumers’ increased utilization after the first year of HSP adoption, it
can be presumed that after building up their HSA savings, they will find that after the
first year that utilization has dropped to a sub-optimal level and will adjust accordingly.
Some have suggested that there are still key components of cost structures that consumers
do not learn over time and can help explain the observation why some important
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utilization, such as medical and pharmaceutical adherence, continue to stay low overtime. An important reason that utilization will stay low in the second period, even with
HSA seed build-up, is consumers’ reactions to prices at the time of service and inability
to process information over certain price schedules.
Tied to the most basic maximization theory, any rational economic agent will
consume to the point where the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost of some
item or service; only at this point will welfare be maximized. The same is true of prices
in healthcare, a consumer will consume some good or service till the marginal benefit of
the service to their overall health is equal to the marginal cost, either out-of-pocket or
from their HSA funds. The problem becomes that these health services have a nondifferentiable cost schedule, leaving an ambiguous marginal cost to the consumer at best.
Economists have theorized various ways in how consumers might react to nonlinear marginal costs, including spot prices, average prices, and expected year-end
marginal prices. Spot prices are simply the price of a healthcare good at the time of
service (Brot-Goldberg 2015). The average price of a good or service will look at, over
time, how much has the same good or service cost. As the price of a good or service will
change once consumers hits their deductible and out-of-pocket max, the consumer will
take all of the various prices for the same good and average them at their different levels,
then treat that average price the same as the marginal price. It is, in effect, an effort by
the consumer to smooth out the marginal cost function. It has been suggested that the
final method for maximization is for the consumer to calculate their expected year end
marginal cost, or what they expect to pay for a good at the end of the year if they reach
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their deductible or out-of-pocket max (Ito 2013). The consumer’s expected marginal
price will then be dependent on their previous year-end marginal price, their current
health status, any new plan design changes, changes to their liquidity constraints, and
their subjective probability that a random health shock will occur.
Under perfect information, it should be noted that the more optimal outcome from
these three will be derived from expected year-end marginal costs. Given perfect
information, consumers will realize the marginal benefit of each healthcare good to their
health and will be able to use available information on their health and risks to calculate
the most accurate probability of each random health shock, then saving HSA seed money
according to their personal level of risk aversion to those shocks. At the time of
healthcare consumption, instead of looking at the spot price at all, the consumer will
instead act as if they consumed the year-end price and continue to consume accordingly,
till they eventually reach that year-end price as they pass their deductible or out-of-pocket
max. If this was the case, and consumers reacted fully to this expected marginal price,
then the dip in utilization in the first year of HSP adoption can simply be explained as
consumer putting off healthcare goods for later dates as their seed money builds up.
Reality shows though that, after the first year, instead of learning from the first
year and adjusting their expected year-end marginal prices based on previous year-end
marginal prices, consumers continue to react most strongly to spot prices in both periods
and underutilize certain services (Brot-Goldberg 2015). Similarly, Ito (2013) finds that
consumers in the presence of a non-linear cost structure are not only terrible at
calculating marginal costs, they are rather indifferent to it, showing that “consumers may
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respond to marginal price with a near zero elasticity” while instead putting some small
weight in their decision making on average price of service. Aron-Dine (2015) also
shows that while consumers do not solely base their decisions on expected year-end
marginal prices, they do put some sort of subjective weight on both spot prices and
expected year-end prices, based in part by their liquidity constraints, an extremely high
discount rate, or simply lack of knowledge.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem of non-differentiable marginal cost structures,
spot prices, and average prices in the decision making-process. The consumer is a
regular, risk-averse agent with a demand dependent on their level of health, HSA seed
money, and income. To maximize welfare, a consumer must consume to where their
marginal benefit/ demand curve meets marginal cost, in this case eight units. Given the
difficulties consumers have comprehending non-continuous cost structures, they might
attempt to smooth out prices by considering average total cost instead, resulting in them
consuming five units. However, if they only take into account spot prices in their
valuation, they will consume four units, drastically underutilizing marginally productive
goods.
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Figure 1: Consumer’s demand against different price schedules

Exacerbating this problem is that, in line with the idea that HSPs will create more
conscious consumers given a budget with higher out-of-pocket costs, HSPs and other
HDHPs will have much higher spot prices than other plan designs. For the specialist
visit, the average copay for a HDHP is $47, while the other plans average a copay of $40
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). Should consumers be solely dependent on spot prices,
using RANDs price elasticity of demand we can estimate 1.4 fewer specialist visits used.
Since Aron-Dine (2015)’s results do show at least some small elasticity of demand due to
marginal prices, resulting changes in quantity demanded will be that less is demanded,
but the actual resulting number will be ambiguous at best.
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When basing most of their decisions on spot prices, consumer decisions show that
they have a hard time finding what other spot prices are available in their network. When
faced with a high price, consumers have three options: price shop among different
providers for sufficiently homogenous services, substitute one service for another with a
similar expected benefit with lower costs, or reduce quantity demanded. Studies show
that price shopping and service substitution are an insignificant factor in the cost
reduction from switching to HDHPs; consumers reducing their utilization accounted for
most of the cost savings. Even if a consumer wishes to price shop, it might be near
impossible to actually do so, as some fee schedules, such as those used by hospitals, can
contain up to 15,000 differently priced services, all with technical names most consumers
would be unaware of (Reinhardt 2014).
Consumers reacting more strongly to spot prices might not be all bad however,
and could, consistent with having a higher deductible, even help reduce some moral
hazard. Instead of consuming at the socially optimal level where the marginal benefit of
the good is equal to the marginal price (the market price), the consumer will utilize the
good or service to the point that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal copay,
which is less than the marginal price. Now, consumers on a HSP are forced to deal with
the price at the time of service with a much lower copay. Given that consumers are more
likely to react to spot prices than marginal, there will still be some inefficiencies
compared to if they properly reacted to marginal cost, but so long as the spot price is still
less than the copay of a supply-side plan, then some consumption above the societally
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optimal level of consumption will be diminished, but at an inefficient level where the
marginal benefit and cost do not meet.
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IV. Potential Areas of Improvement
4a. What Needs to be Done
The idea that an insurance plan, fully focused on “consumerism” through higher
out-of-pocket spending can bring a net welfare improvement to the healthcare market by
lowering cost growth without sacrificing health is contingent on the idea that the
consumer has the ability to be a “smart shopper” in a sufficiently competitive market. It
has been shown that Health Savings Accounts, while leading to some cost savings over
time, might cause consumers to sacrifice their health in the long-run. This is, at least in
part, due to the problem of incomplete and asymmetric information preventing consumers
from properly valuing both marginal benefits and marginal costs of healthcare.
Compounding this, the plan design of a HSP is more likely to attract healthier, highincome consumers, leading to at least initial lower costs, which might cause insurers to
improperly incentivize the wrong-type of consumers to join these plans.
If consumerism is the growing trend in US healthcare, and the onus of optimal
healthcare consumption is to be put more in the hands of the consumers, then both
insurers and policy-makers need to get involved to make sure that these consumers can be
socially-optimal shoppers. This includes investment in an information infrastructure,
creating a set of incentives that encourages best behavior from all actors and provides
some sort of signal so that other parties know an effort was made, and not only realizing,
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but also taking steps to ensure that other insurance plan types are available to more at-risk
consumers. HSPs show promise at reducing moral hazard of unproductive goods and
when combined with the correct changes to reduce these information problems might
create some slowing of cost growth without sacrificing health, but until the information
problems inherent to the healthcare market are more thoroughly addressed, without yet
relaxing the assumption of a competitive market, then these plans can risk consumer
health and productivity.

4b. Increasing Information Available
In the presence of non-linear cost structures, an elasticity of demand to spot
prices, and some non-zero elasticity of demand to expected year-end marginal prices,
insurers have a few problems. The first thing insurers must do is increase consumers
awareness that spot prices are not always synonymous with their true marginal prices and
encourage consumers to keep in mind their deductible and out-of-pocket max. Given this
elasticity of demand with spot prices, they must also set up some way to encourage price
shopping or substitution of services, instead of allowing consumers to just not utilize
productive goods.
Work must also be done to cut search costs and increase dissemination of
information in the marketplace for consumers to act optimally and encourage price
shopping and service substitution. Transparency tools containing information such as innetwork providers, cost differentials between homogenous goods, and ratings on specific
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producers of healthcare goods/services, have grown in market share as companies aim to
find new avenues of cutting costs, but utilization remains low. These tools could lead to
high cost savings and enable consumers to be more active shoppers in their healthcare
decisions. West Health Policy Center states that a potential $100 billion could be saved
over ten years by making prices more transparent to consumers (Zamosky 2014). The
cost savings from this increased transparency comes from not only making more
consumers aware of what they can expect at the time of service and encourage this
“consumerism”, while also encouraging price competition from providers to help keep
costs down.
Private companies have already started to invest in transparency tools to allow
consumers to see more information about providers in their area and prices at time of
service. Private companies such as Castlight have begun this effort, providing cost and
charge information to its corporate customer base, and insurance groups themselves have
started the process of increasing transparency, with groups like United providing online
cost estimates to its covered consumers (Meisel 2016). These tools not only give
consumers more information about in-network providers near them, cutting search costs,
but they also show consumers how close they are to their deductible and out-of-pocket
max, which may lead consumers to put less emphasis on their spot prices. These price
shopping tools appear to be initially effective at encourage price shopping, with price
searchers paying 13.95% less for laboratory tests, 13.15% less for advanced imaging, and
1.02% less for clinician office visits than non-searchers (Whaley 2014).
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While this is a good start to encourage the price-conscious shoppers that highdeductible health plans require, similar services must also be made available to the public
for those protected under the Affordable Care Act and Medicare. Some efforts have been
in the works, with the House introducing the Transparent Health Care Pricing Act of
2018, requiring providers to post prices related to healthcare products online, including
but not limited to spot, retail, and discounted prices as paid by different consumers
(United States 2018). While both the private and public sector are taking the right steps,
insurers and policy makers must move forward making a more personalized experience
for consumers who face drastically cost variability based on insurance status, and
providers must also make sure to stress the high marginal benefit of a price conscious
shopper who will eventually see the high spot price under these plans.
While these are good steps that providers, insurers, and even the government can
take, consumers can also do some work themselves to increase healthcare cost
transparency. Online communities for consumers who suffer similar disease states exist
for consumers to share data such as experiences with providers, different treatments, and
general experiences; such services have shown an increase in medical adherence in
participating consumers as well an increase in reported well-being (Wicks 2010). By
facilitating the communication between consumers with similar disease states regarding
what services and procedures worked for them, information on the relative marginal
benefit is spread to all those participating, encouraging stricter adherence and diminishing
potential behavioral hazard.
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The next step then would be to begin working cost data into said communities.
Meisel (2016) suggests consumers in these communities share their final bill containing
both allowed amounts and paid amounts, as well as additional information such as
insurance status, start and end dates, and such figures as deductibles, copays, and out-ofpocket maximums. Preliminary attempts to crowdsource this information is already
being attempted by both private and public organizations, finding that initial testing leads
to better results when looking at services with some controlled level of price variability,
such as colonoscopies and non-emergent surgeries (Meisel 2016). Whether deciding to
share this data through goodwill alone or some cash incentive, with enough data points,
crowdsourcing does show an interesting alternative to traditional insurer-funded
transparency tools, but it remains a rather untested and new area of increasing healthcare
cost transparency.
While these are all promising steps consumers, insurers, and policy-makers alike
can take, as Reinhardt (2014) points out, encouraging consumerism might be good in
most markets, but due to high level of secrecy regarding negotiated prices between
insurers and providers, as well as the vast pricing schedule and high variability a
consumer can be charged, it might be impossible for a consumer to make a sociallyoptimal decision given the information available. This has become a rallying cry for
bipartisanship, with both political parties arguing for increased consumer transparency.
As recently as June 2019, the “Improving Price and Quality Transparency in American
Healthcare To Put Patients First” Executive Order (2019) was signed and put into order.
The main focus of the order is to require providers to post price information in a
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“consumer-friendly” format while also requiring increased availability of de-identified
information for price aggregation purposes. Interestingly enough, the Executive Order
also issues that further work be done to increase the availability of HDHPs paired with
HSAs to consumers, as well as covering more low-cost preventive care before the
deductible in these plans. While all of these are promising steps to increase price
transparency, most of these ideas lack concrete plans, and policy-makers need to keep in
mind that while increasing availability of these high-deductible plans is not a bad plan,
these plans are not suited for every type of consumer.
Whatever the details from the Executive Order might entail, it is promising that
both insurers and policy-makers realize the importance of price information in the
decision-making process. If the growing trend in minimizing healthcare cost growth is to
encourage consumerism in the form of HSPs, then it is imperative that information be
made as costless as possible so that consumers will be able to efficiently utilize it. The
only problem then is that most market-based and legislative solutions have been focused
on facilitating cost information of a service and less exist that focuses on the benefit of a
service beyond targeted advertisements that might stress the importance of such things as
medical adherence. This is no doubt partly due to the wide variability each consumer
faces in regards to a service’s marginal benefit, but as consumers’ health care claims
become more accessible through their computers and transparency tools, insurers and
policy-makers should focus on giving as much information as possible so that consumers
can efficiently evaluate their marginal benefit and costs, facilitating the personal and
socially optimal level of consumption.
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4c. Creating Incentives for Optimal Behavior
Due to the various asymmetric information that both consumers and producers
hold, there is a clear deadweight loss from the optimal solution that can hurt every player
in the game. Using this asymmetric information, the agents try to earn a higher net gain
at the expense of the other players, creating moral hazard problems that bring the market
from its pareto-optimal solution. Due to the presence of this information, no policymaker or insurer can hope to bring the market to the best solution in the presence of
symmetric information; the next best solution is creating a system of incentives that
create a situation that makes it beneficial for both consumers and producers to either
reveal their information or not act upon it. These incentives show up as a clear cost to
insurers, however with the hope that these short-term costs can lead to long-term savings
by encouraging healthy living in consumers.
The insurers’ first problem is creating a system of incentives that make it
beneficial for producers to provide the most productive services to consumers, even if it
does not initially yield a higher return to the producer. This idea has showed up in recent
literature as an argument for switching from a fee-for-service method of payments to
producers to a value based, or fee-for-results, method of reimbursement. Unlike a
traditional fee-for-service payments system where the provider receives payment based
on which service they provide, a value based model provides reimbursement to the
provider of the service from the insurer if the service shows a positive improvement in
the consumer’s health. Some initial case studies do hint at the possibility of success; tests
of implementing a value based model had increased costs in the first year, but settled into
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a 1.1% reduction in healthcare spending. Adherence for consumers participating in the
study did have higher adherence compared to those consumers not participating as well
(Lemak 2015). While more case studies need to be done, initial results for incentivizing
optimal behavior do seem promising.
In practice, this requires the insurer to become a price-setter in the next period for
what the producer has provided this period. The insurer needs to set this price to not only
create an incentive for the provider to give the more productive service, but also a high
enough incentive for the provider to give any service at all and some sort of interest
payment to make up for the time period between when the service was rendered and
when the producer was paid via insurer. This requires some premium on the most
productive service be added to the profitability of said productive service that at least
makes the provider indifferent to the less productive, more profitable service with no
premium.
There must also be some risk pooling between the insurer and the provider in the
case that the optimal service is given. In the case some outside effect results in a net loss
of welfare for the consumer, independent of the service provided, the provider still needs
to be reimbursed for giving the more productive service, even if some random event
lowers the consumer’s health. Finally, there must be some sort of information
infrastructure in place that allows for insurers to see what service was provided, how the
consumer’s health has changed, while also controlling for noise that might have effected
consumer health independent of the service. So far, most of the case studies for a value
based reimbursement schedule have taken place in large insurance networks with many
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plans, employing a vast number of providers, and this type of fee schedule, at least for the
near future, might only work in these large groups. While this does not bode well for
smaller health insurance groups or private providers, the value based schedule does show
initially promise.
The next information problem that must be worked on, that HSP’s plan structure
alone cannot fix, is the consumer‘s moral hazard over the insurer. It has been shown that,
given the unobservable nature of the consumer’s actions, the consumer may have a
perverse incentive to lead to actions that are not pareto-optimal. The insurer cannot fix
this, but what they can do is create a series of incentives in the contract that allows for
payments on observable good behavior, leading to a societal outcome that is second only
to the contract with perfect information.
The first thing the insurer must do is create a valuation on these incentives. In
effect, for each consumer, they must find the difference in disutility between the more
healthy option, which provides a consumer disutility, and the more-liked unhealthy
option. The incentive payment will then be equal to some amount that at least makes the
average consumer indifferent to the healthy and unhealthy action, all else held constant.
The problem is there must be some sort of informational cue that lets the insurer know
that the healthier action was taken.
This is where the importance of signaling in contracts and health insurance comes
into play. Signaling is any bit of information that becomes freely available to all agents,
with the information revealing something about the consumer’s chosen action. This
signaled information will “regardless of how noisy it is, will have a positive value (if
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costlessly obtained and administered in contract)” (Hölmstrom 1979). In other words,
any information readily made available resulting from a consumer’s actions will
efficiently be utilized by the insurer; for example, in regards to an incentive payment, as
soon as an insurer receives some information signal on a consumer’s healthy action, they
can reward it with the incentive payment. In healthcare though, information is rarely free
and might even become costly to multiple parties involved.
If there is a cost to receiving an informative signal, then the signal becomes a
conditional information system to the insurer. This states that the insurer will only invest
in receiving an information signal so long as the benefit of knowing and acting on the
information is above the cost to achieve it. It is not very likely in that the consumers will
send signals that are somehow loud enough that the insurer will not have to invest some
amount of money to receive them. In this case, the insurer in effect enters the market for
observable signals from consumers, where they will invest in information tools that helps
increase the visibility of what action the consumer has chosen. Then, following standard
maximization theory, the invest money into transparency tools until the marginal benefit
of the newly observed signal is equal to the marginal cost the insurer must pay to receive
one more signal or unit of information.
One example where this kind of incentives based on signals received is smoking
cessation programs. Under normal conditions an insurer cannot know whether a
consumer smokes or does not; the consumer must self-identify as a smoker. However,
should consumers be willing to join smoker cessation programs provided by the insurer,
then they will be tested for whether or not they are a smoker, in effect sending a signal to
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the insurer about their health status based on a value dependent on the consumer’s choice.
What’s more, these programs subsidizing good choices in consumers can be much more
successful than those in the absence of subsidies; one study found among two lowincome smoking groups, one group offered a subsidy and the other not, that 50% of those
offered the subsidy remained abstinent from smoking for the length of the study, while
only 19% of those not subsidized remained abstinent (Businelle 2014).
The success of these smoking cessation and similar programs to encourage
healthy consumer actions has largely contributed to the growing trend of employersponsored wellness programs. Currently, half of all employers offer some kind of
wellness program, accounting for 79% of all employees having access to some program
(Mattke 2013). The goal of these programs is cut expected claims in the future by
encouraging healthy consumer choices; further utilization and involvement in said
program might create a sufficiently large signal to ensure a consumer is taking a healthy
action. When creating these wellness programs, insurers need to avoid creating a “cheaptalk” game, where the consumer sends a signal that has no associated cost to them, said
signal is not binding, and the signal is not verifiable (Macho-Stadler 2001). For instance,
a wellness program should reward those that must put in some identifiable effort ex-post
to proving that a concentrated effort was put into improving their health and not just
reward the consumer for joining the wellness platform. Some examples might include
on-site immunizations as well as setting up rewards to using offered fitness programs.
Wellness programs are, of course, not without their own costs, so the potential
problem arises when the benefits of signaling information is too costly for either the
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consumer, insurer, or both. The consumer must create effort to prove they are increasing
their stock of health, while the insurer must pay administrative costs to the wellness
program. A conditional information market is once again created, where the expected
benefit of the signal must not only outweigh the administrative costs of the program for
the insurer, but the benefit of signaling must also outweigh the effort of signaling for the
consumer. Only after the cost/benefit analysis (which itself might create extra costs for
the insurers) should the insurer consider one of these types of programs. Insurers must
also take into effect the risk that these programs might not have a strong influence on
consumer health; studies show that while wellness programs do usually cause consumers
to self-report better health, studies suggest that most wellness programs do not show a
significant increase in clinical measures of health (Song 2019).
If insurers are willing to take this risk, and have also created an incentive payment
equal to the cost of consumer effort, then they must next consider how to distribute the
payment. As most insurance contracts have a fixed cost-sharing rate for some timeperiod, an insurer or administer of a wellness program who receives a signal in the
middle of the contract might face the question of how to distribute their incentive
payment. Insurers might have some reservation on a pure monetary payout, as
consumers might use those funds to pay for other unhealthy actions. Unlike cost sharing
structures such as deductibles, HSP contributions are not as rigidly bound in a contract
period, except by some upper limit set by some legal regulations. That means that as
soon as the insurer gets some signal that the consumer is performing some healthy action,
they can reward the consumer with some incentive payment directly into their HSP
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account. Then, the insurer also has more reassurance that the consumer is not using their
incentive payments on some unhealthy action that will raise costs for them, but instead
the consumer might be further insuring themselves against some random healthcare crisis
not dependent on their actions. As of 2013, only 5% of employers offered this kind of
incentive through their HSPs and HRAs; as time goes on, more empirical testing should
be done to ensure that this creates strong enough incentives to encourage optimal
behavior (Mattke 2013). While HSP plan structure, much like previous insurance plan
structures does not fix the inherent moral hazard information problem intrinsic to
unobservable consumer choice, it does offer a better solution to rewarding consumers
when a sufficiently informative signal is received by an insurer.

4d. Funding Other Plan Types and Increasing HSP Affordability
Health savings accounts are more likely to draw in healthier and higher-income
consumers, causing its costs to be lower and potentially either less healthy consumers to
adopt it. Then one of the insurers’ main job is to correctly set cost-sharing, deductibles,
and out-of-pocket maximums for not only the HSP, but also some other plan for less
healthy consumers so that it encourages consumers to choose the plan that best fits their
healthcare needs. Assuming insurers do set these figures correctly, there is the fear that
these less-healthy plans will face such high cost sharing that they will not be accessible
enough for the average consumer it is available to, and consumers will either join a plan
that does not best satisfy their health needs or just not enter the insurance market at all.
Policy-makers have long recognized the importance of increasing healthcare
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accessibility, and should not only focus on making sure consumers can join the higher
cost-sharing plan, but also make sure if an unhealthy consumer is forced into a HSP, that
they can afford medically necessary services.
One recent attempt at incentivizing more consumers to join the insurance market
was the Affordable Care Act’s Individual Mandate (or Shared Responsibility fee). The
Mandate created a fee for those that were eligible but chose to remain uninsured. The
idea of the mandate was to create an incentive for those healthy consumers that would
otherwise stay uninsured to enter the public insurance market, causing the average risk of
plans to fall, while also creating new revenue from the Mandate fee and new copays to
fund the less healthy consumers. In its most perfect form, the fee would create a situation
where the consumer who would prefer remaining uninsured would now have to weigh the
disutility of this new fee versus the utility of being insured, with the fee being high
enough to make the average consumer at least indifferent to remaining insured versus
uninsured. The goal of this fee was to induce healthy people to join, keeping average risk
in the insurance pool lower and using the added revenue to help fund less healthy
consumer claims. The goal was at least partially met, with analysts suggesting without
the Individual Mandate, ACA premiums would increase about 6% and millions would,
either by insurance collapse or existing the market, become uninsured (Kamal 2018).
If the Individual Mandate was successful at incentivizing consumers to join the
market and keep costs down while helping fund these plans for unhealthier consumers,
why then, do more insurers not examine the idea of creating some fee for eligible
consumers opting out? One of the key reasons might not only be that these Mandates
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might be harder to enforce in a competitive insurance market, but also due to their
unpopularity. Despite its effectiveness, surveying suggests that the Individual Mandate
was very unpopular; across all political parties, 43% viewed the Individual Mandate very
unfavorably and an additional 20% viewed it somewhat unfavorably, eventually leading
to the mandates repeal (Kitzinger 2017). Clearly, some of the unpopularity stemmed
from the highly politicized nature of the ACA, but some of it might have to do with the
framing of the mandate as a punishment for those that chose to remain uninsured. The
growing field of behavioral economics looks at how loss aversion might affect consumer
decision and shows that framing a situation as a potential loss instead of a potential gain
will evoke a much stronger reaction from a person (Levin 1998). In that regard, playing
on loss averse nature of humans might have been its greatest blessing and curse: it made
the Individual Mandate successful in incentivizing healthy consumers to join the market
but it also made it widely unpopular as those same consumers feared the loss it created, in
part leading to its repeal.
Now that it has been repealed, policy makers might look into alternatives to the
Individual Mandate, such as a tax credit to encourage healthy consumers to join the
insurance market. The goal would be similar to the Mandate, where healthy consumers
are incentivized to join and lower the average risk pool, but instead of a fee for not
joining, consumers are given a refundable tax credit based on income level that can be
used solely to subsidize health insurance. The policy would be similar to the Premium
Tax Credit, which subsidizes health premiums for those with incomes 100 to 400% of the
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federal poverty line, but would increase access for those outside of the poverty limits and
allow more freedom to choosing a plan (The Premium Tax Credit - The Basics 2019).
The RAND Corporation, running initial tests on what said tax incentive might
look like, estimates that such a tax incentive could cause anywhere from 2.3 to 10 million
previously uninsured to join the market without significantly increasing healthcare costs
(0-2% increase), but potentially increasing government spending (anywhere from 0.56.4%) (McGlynn 2010). If successfully implemented, such a tax credit lower the
liquidity constraints of lower income consumers and allow more consumers to join either
a high-deductible or low-deductible plan. As these consumers enter the market, should
plan structures be set in a way that correctly incentivizes those to join based on their
health level and risk aversion, then as a percentage of these newly entering consumers
join the low-deductible plan, then more risk will be spread out along with a higher
revenue from the increase in cost-sharing, leading to higher plan profitability The next
steps policy-makers should do is begin looking into how such a tax credit might be
created, how to lower potential administrative burden, and a cost-benefit analysis, but
such a credit could lead encourage higher accessibility, saving these alternative plans to
HSAs and HDHPs.
Work also must be done to make sure those less healthy consumers who are
forced into these HDHPs be able to afford high return services. Legislation is already in
progress to lower the spot prices of these high-value goods and services so that HSA
enrollees will demand them to a level consistent with their positive externalities and
marginal health returns. The Chronic Disease Management Act introduced by Congress
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would, if passed, provide care with no deductible to HSP members with medically
complex chronic diseases should they be disabling, life threatening, or have a high risk of
hospitalization (United States Congress 2018). Perhaps a bit more ambitious, in the
House of Representatives the Bipartisan HSA Improvement Act would provide a vast
variety of changes to HSAs that would improve access to care while still maintaining
some level of costs savings. These are including, but not limited to increasing
contribution limits, allowing more goods and services to be used at specified clinics at
lower costs even before the deductible is met, and expanding access to lower cost
services such as telemedicine (United States Congress 2018).
Both of these bills are at least part of an attempt to lower the spot prices of
medically necessary goods and services. The Chronic Disease Management Act focuses
more on the micro-economics of the plan design, requiring calculation of the marginal
benefit of a procedure for a chronically ill patient and adjusting the marginal cost so that
there is sufficient reason to use said service. Meanwhile, at least somewhat tied to microeconomics allowing for an increase in HSA contributions, the Bipartisan HSA
Improvement Act is more focused in macro-economics, expanding market choices for
HSA enrollees as well as encouraging market growth for cheaper alternatives with the
focus of keeping the spot prices of these newly expanded market choices low.
Proponents, besides seeing these acts as a means to decrease underutilization, see these
act as a remedy to help the underlying problem inherent in income inequality, where
lower-income patients with chronic conditions might not actively care for conditions,
leading to short-term savings with an increased risk on catastrophic future costs.
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Detractors of this act seem to fear that as more goods and services are covered before the
deductible is met, the HSP becomes less and less of a consumer-driven health plan, and
savings once realized by HSPs will be chipped away. Despite the potential for both costsavings and health gains in the population, both bills have been discussed multiple times,
each time ending with more questions and analysis than before, and do not seem to be
gaining any speed.
Given the explosive growth of HSPs in the recent past, and the newness of these
changes in plan designs, not much empirical research exists to test what might actually
happen with these changes in policy. Others have suggested linking employer HSA
contributions inversely to employee incomes, so that lower-income employees will
receive a less stringent budget constraint, although that would almost certainly never
receive bipartisan support. Either through encouraging participation in the marketplace
to help fund insurance plans that best protect the less healthy, or by subsidizing high
return goods for more at-risk HSP consumers, policy-makers and insurers alike need to
work together to make sure this shift of “consumerism” in healthcare does not leave
behind its most vulnerable population.
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V. HSPs in Non-Competitive Markets
This paper has examined the information problems that might inhibit a consumer
from reaching an optimal quantity demanded of productive health services when asked to
be the driver of their healthcare decisions. Likewise, it has examined how incentives
could be structured to allow for consumers, providers, and insurers to reach more optimal
solutions in the face of asymmetric information. It has also examined, under the
framework that HSP offerings are growing and will continue to grow, that steps need to
be taken to lower information rents providers and consumers can receive, while insurers
need to make sure these HSAs paired with a HDHP remain affordable to those who need
care. The focus has been on all of the information imperfections that might hinder HSPs
from slowing cost growth.
In order to more closely examine these information imperfections, and to control
for noise that would result from other market failures, most of the focus of this paper has
been under the loose assumption that aside from information problems, the market is
highly competitive, with providers providing (near) homogenous goods and services and
a multitude of insurers offering various plans so that consumers could find some plan on
the well-developed insurance market that best fit their risk preferences. If those
assumptions held true, then with investment into some type of information infrastructure
that made both marginal cost and benefit valuation available, consumers could be more
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optimal decision-makers and both insurers and providers could have incentives to make
the socially optimal decision. This, however, is a simplification in order to examine one
problem in the insurance/ healthcare market and how it relates to the growing trend of
HSAs tied to HDHPs, and is not an accurate depiction of the market, especially in the
United States.
Both the healthcare and insurance market are highly concentrated, resulting in
economic rents extracted from the consumer. In the insurance industry, the average
largest state insurer owns about 60% of the state market share, ranging anywhere from
24% in Wisconsin to 100% in Alaska and Delaware (Individual Insurance Market
Competition 2019). Concentration in the insurance marketplace only continues to grow
as well; the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a measurement of how competitive a
market is, has grown from 3,916 in 2011 to 4,997 in 2018, with anything above 2,500
representing a highly uncompetitive market (Individual Insurance Market Competition
2019). Likewise, provider concentration continues to grow, with hospital concentration
growing from a HHI of 2,340 in 1987 and reaching 3,161 in 2006 (Gaynor 2012).
While the United States is not alone in having concentrated selling power in the
healthcare and insurance marketplace, the country is an anomaly for how much its
services cost. The US spends a comparable percentage of its Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in healthcare as other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), ranging from 5.8-6.5% of total GDP spent on healthcare, but
utilization of health services is lower than average while prices are extremely higher. For
instance, in 2000 while hospital admissions per 1,000 averaged 154 for all countries, the
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United states stayed low at 118 admissions per 1,000; meanwhile, the average per capita
total health spending averaged about $1,983 for all participating countries, the US
averaged $4,631 per capita spend for healthcare, translating to US citizens paying
roughly 13% of their per capita GDP on healthcare compared to the average 8%
(Anderson 2003). The high prices seem to originate from, in part, a highly fragmented
insurance system that drives up administrative and operating costs, as well as weak
buying power from consumers against a monopolistic competition, or full monopoly,
seller.
These market conditions do not bode well for the high deductible health plan
paired with a HSA in regards to meeting its goal of lowering cost growth. In contracting
a bank to create and manage a health savings account, insurers are adding one more
fragmentation to an already overly-complex healthcare system and further increasing
administrative costs, or even running the risk of another concentrated entity extracting
more rent. If administrative and maintenance fees are pushed onto the consumer, the
consumer with the average savings in a HSA can expect to see fees that range from 1.5 to
2.7%, and depending on the fund administrator, there can be a variety of additional nontransparent fees, such as an excess contribution or insufficient funds fee (Acheson 2018).
This becomes troubling when looking at interest rate earned on HSA funds; the average
HSA holder keeps an account of about $2,000, meaning the maintenance fees are above
the interest earned for almost all major HSA plan administrators, with the very best plan
administrators earning an interest above fees in the account range of $2,500 to $3,000
(Acheson 2018). Compounding all this, there is a large lack of transparency in regard to
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if these calculations encompass all relevant fees, interest rates, and investment portfolios,
so it does make a true cost-benefit analysis difficult.
It is also important in a study of information to examine how prices, in a
competitive market, become conduits of all relevant information. Consumers, with their
own unique set of human capital stock, derived from their time, place, and studies, will
efficiently use information as it becomes available to them. Using this new information
in a market setting will lead to a price change as consumers and/or producers alter their
market choice, so that any price change is due to a relevant information change and
prices, then, reflect all relevant information available (Hayek 1945). This is the basis for
the Efficient Market Hypothesis and a main argument against central planning; no one
person or institution has enough information to do better than the market, as the
decentralized and private economic information each person holds become publically
available in the price system with little to no cost. This is also a major argument for the
importance of price transparency tools in high-deductible health plans; should the price of
a service increase, then to quote Hayek (1945), the consumer will know it is more
“profitability employed elsewhere”, and should the price change be too much given their
elasticity of demand, will shop for substitutes, changing their price and causing a ripple
effect. In this situation, price transparency tools allow the flow of information to be as
costless as possible.
However, in a system without a sufficiently competitive market, this system
breaks down. Instead, as both the medical and insurance marketplaces have a highly
concentrated group of suppliers, their market power will allow them to set the marginal
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price about marginal cost, extracting some rent at the cost of the consumer. The price
system loses its ability to be a functioning tool of information as it is impossible for a
consumer to discern if a change in price is due to market conditions, some price-markup
change, or a mixture of both. Following that logic, the philosophy of creating an
insurance plan that encourages consumerism by facing higher out-of-pocket prices is
problematic then for at least two reasons. One is that requiring consumerism in a
marketplace devoid of the information signals necessary to facilitate smart decision
making is going to lead to people cutting quantity demand below what is socially optimal
as they must face higher prices that do not give them any clue on the state of the market.
Two is that by decentralizing the purchasing power of consumers while they continue to
face a highly-concentrated sellers will only create a situation where sellers can extract a
higher rent from consumers if no governing agency steps in.
If the reality of a highly-priced and concentrated marketplace is now faced, it is
important to look at how the information remedies under a non-competitive marketplace
might fair for HSP users. Investing in price transparency tools will most likely be a still
fruitful endeavor; by cutting search costs on in-network providers and consumers will be
able to save more of their out-of-pocket money. Beyond the private savings these tools
provide consumers, further evidence indicates that increased consumer price-shopping
from these transparency tools encouraged price competition between providers in
monopolistic competition. Using regression analysis, Whaley (2015) found a statistically
significant drop of 1% in lab test prices due to an average penetration of about 6.2%
consumers using a price transparency tool, and while a 6.2% penetration rate did not
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cause a statistically significant physician price decrease, a significant price decrease of
7.4% for physician prices was found at a full penetration rate of the tool. While results
were strongest at a full penetration rate, prices still fell for both price-searchers and nonsearchers alike after the transparency tool was introduced, indicating that as the
prevalence of these tools increase for privately-insured consumers, consumers under the
ACA and Medicare might be able to benefit from lower costs for certain services. The
problem, of course, is ensuring that the marginal benefit of the new price information
outweighs the cost of increasing fragmentation and administrative costs of the existing
system.
Further, it would still be useful for both insurers to not only provide multiple plan
types, with some governing agency stepping in should multiple plans not be available to
insurers, but also encourage ease of access into the insurance market for consumers to
avoid a pool collapse in a high-deductible plan. This would include, but not be limited
to, providing some sort of government-funded, or at least subsidized, insurance, should a
high-deductible plan or no plan at all be available to poor or unhealthy consumers. That
said, a signaling tool, such as a wellness program, must be more closely scrutinized: with
wellness program results being ambiguous at best, and combined with an already highly
fragmented system in the US, it is entirely possible that these programs can just add to
the already high administrative costs without having any real positive effect (Song 2019).
This paper has been an examination of information deficits in the healthcare
industry and why the growing trend of consumer focused insurance plans will not be
effective if consumers do not have the best information available or if any agent has an
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opportunity to receive some informational rent from another. The problem is, even
should perfect information be available, Health Savings Plans will not have some sort of
drastic effect that fixes the broken US healthcare system. While the costs are
undoubtedly lower, and will at least cause some short-term savings, the costs of these
high-deductible plans are already closing the gap between themselves and the existing
plan structures (Kaiser Family Foundation 2018). Some of these short-term savings too
derive from consumers simply not staying adherent to their medication to save money,
increasing the risk of high cost claims (Fronstein 2013). While the HSP is a good plan
design for those that are healthy and/or high income, it will put those most at risk of
catastrophic healthcare costs in danger. Further, the philosophy that incentivizing
smarter shopping will reduce costs ignores the facts that high cost claimants, which in
private insurance make up 1.2% of members but 31% of total spend, cannot afford to
shop for prices in a highly-fragmented healthcare system (Wilson 2016). Until policy
makers focus on the problem of fragmentation of care and high prices in the United
States healthcare system, these consumer-driven health plans will have marginal effects
on savings at best but can substantially increase risk as consumer care and adherence fall.
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VI. Conclusion
Health Savings Plans were created in an attempt to increase consumerism in the
insurance market. The general posit of HSP proponents is that the previous structures
and designs of existing insurance plan encouraged an overconsumption of healthcare
goods, and that by giving the option to save or spend healthcare funds while facing a
higher cost, the average consumer will reduce their overconsumption, leading to moral
hazard in the healthcare market falling and the cost growth of healthcare slowing. Not
only that, but by making a more conscious consumer, the HSP adoptee will decrease
overconsumption of unproductive healthcare goods and services, without under-utilizing
healthcare goods that have a high expected marginal return. In the end, the hope is that
by decentralizing the insurance market, costs will not only fall but everyone will become
a healthy and marginally efficient consumer.
The results, however, are ambiguous at best. There is a significant decrease in the
cost of insurance in the first year, but the cost savings seem to die down by the second
year. Whether that is due to consumers adjusting their expected year-end marginal
prices, building up a HSP savings, or both is up to debate. However, even after costs rise
again in the second year, HSP costs still do stay lower than comparable plans, showing
that at least in that regard HSPs do meet their goal of slowing cost growth. The problem
becomes utilization; utilization in healthcare goods and services with a high marginal
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benefit drop and stay below utilization in other plans. This can lead to disastrous effects
for both the consumer and insurer. Take for example pharmaceutical adherence: if a
consumer does not adhere to the plan the provider lays out for them, then they can
mistakenly believe that their healthcare problems are under control, leading to high cost
claims and lowered utilization in the long-run, much to the detriment of everyone
involved.
Part of the problem is that HSPs alone cannot deal with the intrinsic imperfect
information in the healthcare and insurance market, and in some cases, can exacerbate the
situation. For example, HSPs attract healthier consumers, making their cost-sharing
lower and perhaps enticing some less healthy consumers into the plan or creating a
situation where insurers believe it is most profitable to push consumers into said plan.
Consumers also, while lowering consumption of less beneficial healthcare goods, also
lower utilization of very beneficial healthcare goods, in part because they do not
understand either the marginal benefit of the good to their health or the real marginal cost
of the good due to high spot prices. Beyond that, due to higher deductibles, HSAs leave
consumers open to more risks in the face of dishonest producers.
While HSPs surely cannot be blamed for information problems that have existed
in these markets forever, insurers and producers must be aware of how these existing
information problems can be made better or worse by the introduction of HSPs. Thanks
to its high deductibles and incentives which are more likely to pull healthier people,
moral hazard should be reduced as consumers react to higher prices and healthier
consumers, who are more likely to be drawn to the plan, might take healthier actions.
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However, insurers might think twice before assuming a broad introduction of HSPs is the
best strategy; consumers, whether unsure of the true marginal benefit or reacting solely to
spot prices instead of expected year-end marginal costs, also decrease socially optimal
consumption that can lead to long-term higher cost claims. Not only that, but the plans
are more likely to attract and benefit healthier, high-income consumers, and as the plan
popularity grows and more vulnerable consumers are forced into them, not only will
these vulnerable consumers be unable to meet their medical needs, but as plan cost rise,
healthy consumers will leave the plan, causing further growth of costs.
HSPs cannot handle these information problems solely by its plan design, and to
work their best, insurers and policy-maker need to make sure these plans are not
introduced in a vacuum. The most important thing insurers and policy-makers need to do
is to make sure that, if consumerism is the approach that they believe will lead to a net
improvement in healthcare, make sure information is available and understandable to the
average consumer so they can make the best choice. Insurers also need to make sure the
correct incentives are in place to encourage socially optimal behavior, especially now that
consumers face higher out-of-pocket costs. Multiple plans offering various levels of risk
protection must be available as well, and if necessary, policy makers should step in to
help make sure the most vulnerable consumers can find protection.

Health Savings

Plans have already proven successful in reducing costs; by creating systems that reduce
these information imperfections concurrently with the plan, Health Savings Plans might
be able to slow some cost growth, but policy makers need to realize they do not tackle the
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fundamental flaw with the US healthcare market that is a weak consumer purchasing
power and high administrative and service costs.
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